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Abstract
A certificateless signature retains the efficiency of
Shamir’s identity-based signature while it does not suffer from the inherent private key escrow problem, which
is first introduced by S. Al-Riyami and K. Paterson in
Asiacrypt 2003. In this paper, we proposed a new certificateless signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. The
proposed scheme is more efficient than those of previous
schemes by pre-computing the pairing e(P, P ) = g and
publishing as the system parameters, it needs not to compute the pairing in the Sign stage, and only needs to compute three pairings in the Verify stage. In addition, the
proposed scheme does not need the special MaptoPoint
hash function and the confidential channel between KGC
and users. The proposed scheme is unforgeable under the
hardness assumption of the q-strong Diffie-Hellman problem and Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
Keywords: Bilinear Pairings, Certificateless Signature, qStrong Diffie–Hellman Problem
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Introduction

A digital signature is one of the most important security primitives in modern cryptography. In a traditional
public key signature scheme, methods to guarantee the
authenticity of a public key are required, since the public
key of the signer is actually a type of random string. To
provide the binding between a signer and his public key,
the traditional public key signature uses a certificate that
is a digitally signed statement issued by the CA (Certification Authority). The need for public key infrastructure
(PKI) supporting certificates is considered the main difficulty in the deployment and management of public key
signature schemes.
First proposed by Shamir [10], identity-based public
key cryptography tackles the problems of authenticity of

keys in a different way to traditional PKI. The identitybased signature scheme can dispense with certificates,
the key escrow of a user’s private key is inherent in the
identity-based signature scheme [3, 5, 7]. A trusted third
party called the PKG (Private Key Generator) manages
the generation and distribution of the users’ private keys.
In Asiacrypt 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced
and made concrete the concept of certificateless public key
cryptography [9]. A certificateless signature scheme does
not require the use of certificates and yet does not have the
inherent key escrow problem of the identity-based signature scheme [8, 12]. Unlike the PKG in an identity-based
signature scheme, the KGC (Key Generating Center) in
a certificateless signature scheme does not have access to
the user’s private key. The KGC derives a partial private
key from the user’s identity and the master key. The user
then combines the partial private key with some secret
information to generate the actual private signing key.
The system is not identity-based, because the public key
is no longer computable from a user identity. However,
no authentication of the public key is necessary and no
certificate is required.
In this paper, we proposes a new certificateless signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. The proposed
scheme is more efficient than those of previous schemes
by pre-computing the pairing e(P, P ) = g and publishing
as the system parameters, thus it need not to compute
the pairing in the Sign stage, and only need to compute three pairings in the Verify stage. In addition, the
proposed scheme does not need the special MaptoPoint
hash function. Finally, we proved the proposed scheme
is unforgeable under the hardness assumption of the qstrong Diffie–Hellman problem and Computational DiffieHellman problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe background concepts on bilinear pairings and related mathematical problems. In Section 3, we
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present a new certificateless signature scheme. The secu- Since then, several certificateless signature shcemes were
rity and efficiency analysis are given in Section 4. Finally, presented [8, 12]. In this section, we propose a new cerwe conclude the paper with Section 5.
tificateless signature scheme from bilinear pairings.
A certificateless signature scheme is a 7-tuple of
polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Partial-Private2 Preliminaries
Key-Extract,
Set-Secret-Value,
Set-Private-Key,
Set-Public-Key, Sign, Verify), where Setup and
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Partial-Private-Key-Extract are performed by a
Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive. KGC. Since Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, and
Let (G1 , +) and (G2 , ·) be two cyclic groups of the same Set-Public-Key are executed by a user, the key escrow
prime order q. The bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 ×G1 → of the user’s private key is not inherent in a certificateless
signature scheme.
The detailed descriptions of the
G2 , which satisfies the following properties:
proposed certificateless signature scheme are depicted as
• Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ G1 follows.
and a, b ∈ Zq∗ .
• Non-degenerate: If P is a generator of G1 , then Setup:
e(P, P ) is a generator of G2 . In other words, This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and
returns the system parameters and master key. More spee(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
cially, this algorithm runs as follows. Let G1 be a cyclic
• Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q,
G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q,
compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G1 .
and e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing.
Typically, the map e will be derived from either Weil
or Tate pairing on a elliptic curve over a finite field.
1) Choose s ∈R Zq∗ and set Ppub = sP and compute
g = e(P, P ).

2.2

Diffie-Hellman Problems

We also introduce here the computational problems that
will form the basis of security for the proposed certificateless signature scheme.
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two
group elements P and Q in G1 , find an integer n, such
that Q = nP whenever such an integer exists.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP):
For any a, b ∈ Zq∗ , given (P, aP, bP ), compute abP .
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For
any a, b, c ∈ Zq∗ , given (P, aP, bP, cP ), decide whether
c = ab mod q.
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Group: We define G1 as
a GDH group if G1 is a group such that DDHP can be
solved in polynomial time, but no algorithm can solve
CDHP with non-negligible advantage within polynomialtime.
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (q-SDHP):
Given a (q + 2)-tuple
(P, Q, αQ, α2 Q, · · · , αq Q), find a pair (c, (c + α)−1 P )
with c ∈ Zq∗ .

3

An Efficient Certificateless Signature Scheme

At the AsiaCrypt 2003 conference, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced and made concrete the concept of certificateless public key cryptography, a model for the use of
public key cryptography which avoids the inherent escrow
of identity-based cryptography and yet does not require
certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys.

2) Choose cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
Zq∗ and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Zq∗ .
3) Set
the
system
parameters
as
{G1 , G2 , q, P, Ppub , g, H1 , H2 } and keep the master
key s secret.
The system parameters are distributed to the users of
the system through a secure authenticated channel.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract:
This algorithm takes as input the system parameters, the
master key, and an identifiable information and returns
its corresponding partial private key. More formally, to
construct the partial private key for Alice with identifiable
information IDA , we adopt the blind technique as in [11]
to remove the requirement of confidential and authentic
channel between Alice and KGC in this stage.
1) Alice chooses a value k ∈R Zq∗ to compute kP , then
Alice sends his identity IDA and kP to the KGC.
2) KGC checks that Alice has a claim to a particular
online identifier IDA . If they do, the KGC computes
0
DID
= (H1 (IDA ) + s)−1 P + s(kP ), then sends it
A
to Alice through an open channel.
3) Alice computes DIDA
(H1 (IDA ) + s)−1 P .

=

0
DID
− k(sP )
A

=
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Alice
IDA k kP

KGC
k ∈R Zq∗
IDA k kP
−−−−−−−→

DIDA
0
= DID
− kPpub
A
= (H1 (IDA ) + s)−1 P

0
DID
A
←−−−

0
DID
=
A
(H1 (IDA ) + s)−1 P
+s(kP )
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with public key P KIDA =< XA , YA >, this algorithm
runs as follows.
1) Check whether or not the equality e(XA , Ppub ) =
e(YA , P ) holds. If not, stop and reject the signature.
Otherwise, continue.
2) Compute r = e(U, H1 (IDA )XA + YA )g −v
3) Check if v = H2 (m k r) holds. If it does, accept the
signature. Otherwise, stop and reject the signature.

This completes the description of our proposed certificateless signature scheme. In the following section, we
Anyone else cannot get Alice’s private key un- analyze the scheme from performance and security points
less he can get ksP from kP and sP , which is a of view.
hard CDH problem. Alice can get his private key
0
by DID
− kPpub because k is chosen by himself.
A
4 Analysis of the Proposed CerNotice that Alice can verify the correctness of the
Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm output by
tificateless Signature Scheme
checking that e(DIDA , H1 (IDA )P + Ppub ) = g.

4.1

Correctness Analysis

Set-Secret-Value:
Consistency of the proposed scheme is satisfied. In effect,
This algorithm takes as input the system parameters and
if σ = (U, v) is a valid signature of a message m for Alice
an identifiable information and returns its corresponding
with public key P KIDA =< XA , YA >, then
secret value. More specially, to set the secret value for
Alice, choose xA ∈R Zq∗ , and output xA as her secret
e(XA , Ppub ) = e(XA , sP ) = e(sXA , P ) = e(YA , P ) (1)
value.
Set-Private-Key:
−v
This algorithm takes as input the system parame- r = e(U, H1 (IDA )XA + YA )g
−1
−v
ters, a partial private key, and a secret value and
= e((a + v)SKIDA , H1 (IDA )x−1
A P + xA sP )g
returns corresponding private key.
More specially,
−v
= e((a + v)(H1 (IDA ) + s)−1 xA P, (H1 (IDA ) + s)x−1
A P )g
to construct the private key for Alice, compute
= e(P, P )a+v g −v
SKIDA = xA DIDA = xA (H1 (IDA ) + s)−1 P as her
private key.
= ga
(2)
Set-Public-Key:
This algorithm takes as input the system parameters
and a secret value and outputs corresponding public 4.2 Performance Analysis
key. More specially, to construct the public key for According to the state-of-the-art results in [1] and [2],
−1
Alice, compute XA = x−1
A P , YA = xA Ppub , and set one bilinear pairing operation requires at least 10 times
P KIDA =< XA , YA > as her public key.
more multiplications in the underlying finite field than
an elliptic curve point scalar multiplication does in the
Sign:
same finite field. In addition, most of the ID-based and
Given a message m and a private key SKIDA , perform Certificateless cryptosystems require a special hash functhe following steps.
tion called map-to-point hash function ([3, 4, 9, 12]) for
converting a user’s identity to a point on the underly1) Choose a ∈R Zq∗ .
ing elliptic curve. This operation is also time consuming
a
and cannot be treated as a conventional hash operation
2) Compute r = g ∈ G2 .
which is commonly ignored in performance evaluation. A
3) Set v = H2 (m k r) ∈ Zq∗ .
map-to-point hash function, on the other hand, is usually implemented as a probabilistic algorithm and is more
4) Compute U = (a + v)SKIDA ∈ G1 .
expensive than a point scalar multiplication in terms of
∗
5) Set σ = (U, v) ∈ G1 × Zq as the signature of the computation time.
In the proposed scheme, the pairing e(P, P ) = g can
message m.
be pre-computed and published as the system parameters.
Verify:
Thus, it not need to compute pairing in the Sign stage,
To verify a signature σ = (U, v) of a message m for Alice and it only needs to compute three pairings in the Verify
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Table 1: Performance comparison of CLS schemes

Sign

[9]

Verify
Sign

[8]

Verify

Our

Sign

scheme

Verify

Pairing

Scalar Multi

Add

Exponentiation

MaptoPoint

Operation

in G1

in G1

in G2

Operation

1
4
0
4
0
3

2
0
2
1
1
1

1
0
0
1
0
1

1
1
0
0
1
0

need
need
don’t need

stage. In addition, the proposed scheme does not need the
special MaptoPoint hash function. In Table 1, we summarize the number of different operations of some wellknown certificateless signature schemes and our scheme
proposed above. We ignore the time taken by conventional hash operations and point addition operations as
they are much more efficient when compared with pairings, scalar multiplications, and map-to-point hash operations. From Table 1, we can conclude that our scheme is
a little more efficient than Al-Riyami and Paterson’s certificateless signature scheme [9] and X. Li, K. Chen and
L. Sun’s certificateless signature scheme [8].

Then, there exists an algorithm B that is able to solve the
q-SDHP for q = qh1 in an expected time

4.3

5

Security Analysis

t ≤ 120686qh1 qh2 (t+O(qs , τp ))/(²(1−q/2k ))+O(q 2 τmult ).
(3)
where τmult and τp respectively denote the cost of a scalar
multiplication in G2 and the required time for a pairing
evaluation.
The formal security analysis is the same as Barreto
et al.’s provably-secure identity-based signatures [3], we
refer to [3] for more details.

Conclusions

The proposed scheme is unforgeable under the hardness
assumption of the q-strong Diffie–Hellman problem and
Computational Diffie–Hellman problem.
On the one hand, even the KGC who knows the master
key s, the partial private key of Alice, and the public key
< XA , YA > of Alice, cannot compute a valid signature.
If he can compute xA from the equalities XA = xA P or
YA = xA sP , then he can forge BLS signatures [5] which
are proven to be unforgeable based on the CDH assumption.
On the other hand, any third party may try to compute
a valid signature via two ways.

In order to avoid the inherent escrow of identity-based
cryptography and yet not requiring certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys, Certificateless public key cryptography was first introduced by Al-Riyami
and Paterson in Asiacrypt 2003, and has received a significant attention in recent years. In this paper, we proposed a new certificateless signature scheme based on bilinear pairings, the proposed scheme is more efficient than
those of previous schemes by pre-computing the pairing
e(P, P ) = g and publishing as the system parameters.
The scheme is proved to be secure under under the hardness assumption of the bilinear pairing inversion problem
• In the first place, he randomly chooses the value and Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
U and tries to compute v such that v = H2 (m k
e(U, H1 (IDA )xA + YA )g −v ) holds.
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